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INTRODUCTION 
We are in a time of financial distress: approximately 18% of 
Americans with debt will not be able to repay it in their lifetimes.1 As of 
2013, the 14 million American families with the lowest net worth owe 
debts equal to about 156% of their pretax incomes. 2  Over-indebted 
Americans have limited options for seeking relief—debt settlement is 
one of them.3 
Debt settlement can provide an effective solution to over-
indebtedness, and a myriad of companies offer this service to debt-
ridden consumers. First, the consumer provides a debt settlement 
company with the names of his creditors and the amounts he owes to 
each.4 At that time, the debt settlement company will likely instruct the 
                                                                                                                 
 1. See Martha C. White, The Most Completely Depressing Stat About Americans’ 
Debt, TIME (Dec. 11, 2014), http://time.com/3627010/americans-debt/ [http://perma.cc/ 
L5QB-45BH]. 
 2. See Mark Whitehouse, America’s Poor, Deeper in Debt Than Ever, 
BLOOMBERG VIEW (Sept. 12, 2014, 11:02 AM), http://www.bloombergview.com/article 
s/2014-09-12/america-s-poor-deeper-in-debt-than-ever [http://perma.cc/9TSF-5GKA]. 
As of October 2015, the total U.S. outstanding consumer debt was approximately $3.5 
trillion and the total U.S. outstanding revolving debt was approximately $923 billion. 
See http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/g19/current/default.htm [http://perma.cc/8X 
2V-U2MF]. 
 3. See FED. TRADE COMM’N, COPING WITH DEBT 1 (2012), http://www.consumer. 
ftc.gov/articles/pdf-0037-coping-with-debt.pdf [http://perma.cc/JQ85-LDBM]. 
 4. LaToya Irby, The Dangers of Debt Settlement, ABOUT.COM, 
http://credit.about.com/od/debtmanagementsolutions/qt/debtsettlement.htm [http://per 
ma.cc/H6DB-JCN8]. 
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consumer to cease payments to his creditors 5  and to instead make 
monthly payments to a designated savings account. 6  When the debt 
settlement company determines that this account has accumulated 
sufficient funds in proportion to the debt the consumer owes to a 
particular creditor, the company will attempt to negotiate and settle the 
debts on behalf of the consumer.7 The debt settlement company usually 
demands a settlement amount below the full balance owed by the 
consumer, but to be paid in lump sum to the creditor so that the 
agreement is mutually beneficial.8 When the debt settlement company 
successfully reaches a settlement, a lump sum is then paid from the 
consumer’s savings account to the creditor, and the company will 
attempt to reach a settlement with the next creditor.9 
On its face, debt settlement is an attractive option: consumers are 
promised a debt-free future by these companies.10 Their services enable 
a weary debtor to engage a third party to act as the middleman between 
him and pressing creditors.11 It is a way out of what might otherwise be 
a lifetime of over-indebtedness for consumers willing to make a single, 
albeit lesser, payment on the total amount of debt they owe. 12  In 
addition, the potential savings realized from debt settlement programs 
can be significant when compared with the alternatives, such as 
                                                                                                                 
 5. See Stephen Franklin, Desperate Debtors Are Ripe Targets, CHI. TRIB. (Aug. 3, 
2008), http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2008-08-03/news/0808030051_1_debt-settlem 
ent-credit-card-consumers [http://perma.cc/JY7G-ZBWW]. 
 6. See FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 3. 
 7. See National Association of Attorneys General, Comment Letter on the 
Proposed Rulemaking to Amend the FTC’s Telemarketing Sales Rule 2-3 (Oct. 23, 
2009) [hereinafter NAAG Comment], http://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/ 
public_comments/2009/10/543670-00192.pdf [http://perma.cc/YE4B-FF94]. 
 8. See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-10-593T, DEBT SETTLEMENT: 
FRAUDULENT, ABUSIVE, AND DECEPTIVE PRACTICES POSE RISK TO CONSUMERS 4 (2010) 
[hereinafter GAO Report], http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d10593t.pdf [http://perma.cc/ 
BHA6-NEKC]. 
 9. See Debt Settlement Companies, BALANCE, http://www.balancepro.net/educatio 
n/publications/debtsettlement.html [http://perma.cc/RL8Q-GH36]. 
 10. See N.Y.C. BAR ASS’N, PROFITEERING FROM FINANCIAL DISTRESS: AN 
EXAMINATION OF THE DEBT SETTLEMENT INDUSTRY 6 (May 2012), http://www2.nycbar. 
org/pdf/report/uploads/DebtSettlementWhitePaperCivilCtConsumerAffairsReportFINA
L5.11.12.pdf [http://perma.cc/JP3K-M3ND]. 
 11. Franklin, supra note 5. 
 12. See Derek S. Witte, The Bear Hug That Is Crushing Debt-Burdened 
Americans: Why Overzealous Regulation of the Debt-Settlement Industry Ultimately 
Harms the Consumers It Means to Protect, 14 TEX. REV. L. & POL. 277, 287-88 (2010). 
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struggling to make minimum payments on debt.13 Indeed, these benefits 
can provide a lifeline to consumers in significant debt, but only when 
the process is effectuated without unfair, deceptive, or abusive 
practices.14 
In practice, debt settlement companies effectively accomplish their 
purpose so rarely that the industry has become a dangerous option for 
debt relief. 15  The problem begins at the root, as a consumer only 
becomes a client if he is so financially distressed16 that he has already 
defaulted on his debt.17 Defaulting on debt carries inevitable financial 
impacts, such as increased interest rates, 18 and commencing settlement 
negotiations does not protect a consumer from incurring greater debt, or 
even from being sued for payment. 19 In addition, debt settlement comes 
with inherent risks20 such as high costs in service fees,21 income tax 
liability,22 and declining consumer credit scores.23 These effects together 
                                                                                                                 
 13. The Association of Settlement Companies, Comment on the Proposed 
Rulemaking to Amend the FTC’s Telemarketing Sales Rule 9 n.6 (Oct. 26, 2009) 
[hereinafter TASC Comment], http://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/public_ 
comments/2009/10/543670-00202.pdf [http://perma.cc/NN2N-J6QA]. 
 14. See Franklin, supra note 5. 
 15. See Should I Use a Debt Settlement Service to Help Me Deal with My Debt and 
Debt Collectors?, CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU (June 18, 2014), http://www.consume 
rfinance.gov/askcfpb/1459/should-i-use-debt-settlement-service-help-me-deal-my-debt-
and-debt-collectors.html [http://perma.cc/5CVU-DH9Z] (warning against the use of 
services provided by debt settlement companies). 
 16. See generally N.Y.C. BAR ASS’N, supra note 10 (discussing how debt 
settlement companies target financially distressed consumers). 
 17. See ELLEN HARNICK & LESLIE PARRISH, CTR. FOR RESPONSIBLE LENDING, A 
ROLL OF THE DICE: DEBT SETTLEMENT STILL A RISKY STRATEGY FOR DEBT-BURDENED 
HOUSEHOLDS 5, (Nov. 2013), http://www.responsiblelending.org/other-consumer-
loans/debt-settlement/research-analysis/CRL-Debt-Settlement-Research-Paper-and-App 
endix.pdf [http://perma.cc/JH8G-JXJP]; see also Michelle Singletary, Debt Settlement 
is Rarely a Done Deal, WASH. POST (Oct. 20, 2012), http://www.washingtonpost.com/b 
usiness/debt-settlement-is-rarely-a-done-deal/2012/10/18/d9abe54e-1881-11e2-8bfd-12 
e2ee90dcf2_story.html [http://perma.cc/AE85-BAMU]. 
 18. See HARNICK & PARRISH, supra note 17, at 5. 
 19. Id. 
 20. See First Amended Complaint at 2-3, Chase Bank USA v. Allegro Law, LLC, 
No. 08-CV-04039 (PKC), 2013 WL 3149461 (E.D.N.Y. 2013) (identifying the inherent 
risks of debt settlement programs and their consequences to consumers). 
 21. See Debt Settlement Companies, supra note 9. 
 22. See HARNICK & PARRISH, supra note 17, at 13. 
 23. See Eleanor Laise, Debt-Relief Firms Attract Complaints, WALL ST. J. (Oct. 14, 
2008, 12:01 AM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB122394458494631223 [http://perma. 
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make it unlikely that consumers will greatly benefit from enrolling in a 
debt settlement program.24 
Beyond these inherent risks, other widespread industry practices 
cause further harm to consumers. For example, debt settlement 
companies often charge advance fees before settling any debts, which 
places consumers in further financial distress before obtaining any sort 
of debt relief.25 In addition, many companies lull consumers into a false 
sense of security by guaranteeing settlement, despite their inability to 
control the outcome of negotiations, as well as minimum reductions to 
final payments from the principal debt owed.26 
The federal government27 and many state governments have taken 
steps to eradicate this behavior.28 Even still, debt settlement companies 
continue to cause harm to consumers who are desperate for debt relief.29 
Short of eliminating the debt settlement industry altogether, what more 
can be done to make debt settlement fair and beneficial to consumers?30 
                                                                                                                 
cc/T7N5-TH46]. 
 24. See, e.g., N.Y.C. BAR ASS’N, supra note 10, at 63 (explaining that typically less 
than 10% of consumers successfully settle all their debt as part of the debt settlement 
program). 
 25. See GAO Report, supra note 8, at 7. 
 26. Id. at 13. 
 27. The Federal Trade Commission has the ability to prohibit “unfair or deceptive 
acts or practices” for non-banks while the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau may 
prohibit “unfair, deceptive, or abusive” acts or practices in connection with consumer 
financial products or services. See 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1) (2012) and 12 U.S.C. § 5531(a) 
(2012) for the above language, respectively. The Federal Trade Commission and the 
Consumer Financial Protection Bureau divide jurisdiction over debt settlement 
companies to ensure that their “services are fair, transparent and competitive” and that 
their business practices are not “anticompetitive, deceptive, or unfair to consumers.” 
See Memorandum of Understanding Between the Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau and the 
Fed. Trade Comm’n [hereinafter Memorandum of Understanding], http://www.ftc.g 
ov/system/files/120123ftc-cfpb-mou.pdf [http://perma.cc/49KQ-JZEH]. 
 28. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 42-110g (West, Westlaw through 2015 
Sess.); GA. CODE ANN. § 10-1-399 (West, Westlaw through 2015 Sess.); N.Y. GEN. 
BUS. LAW § 349 (McKinney, Westlaw through 2015 Sess.). 
 29. See, e.g., Stipulated Final Judgment and Consent Order, Consumer Fin. Prot. 
Bureau v. Meracord LLC, No. 3:13-cv-05871 (W.D. Wash. Oct. 4, 2013), 
http://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/201310_cfpb_meracord-proposed-stipulated-final-
judgment-and-consent-order.pdf [http://perma.cc/MJ2Z-CZAM]; see also N.Y.C. BAR 
ASS’N, supra note 10, at 77-94 (discussing the new attorney model of debt settlement). 
 30. Witte, supra note 12, at 293-95 (arguing that the debt settlement industry is a 
necessary middle ground debt-relief option for some consumers). 
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This Note proceeds in three parts. Part I examines the harmful 
practices of debt settlement companies and evaluates the effectiveness 
of current federal and state regulatory schemes that are meant to deter 
those practices. Part II describes the ongoing harmful practices of debt 
settlement companies notwithstanding the regulations. Finally, in Part 
III, this Note recommends: (1) further regulatory action in the form of 
mini Consumer Financial Protection Acts (“mini-CFPAs”) within every 
state that would empower state attorneys general and individual 
consumers with the right to impose high civil penalties against debt 
settlement companies that continue any harmful practices; and (2) surety 
bonds to ensure that debt settlement companies do not avoid penalties 
associated with mini-CFPAs by dissolving their businesses with the 
intent to continue harmful practices under a different name. 
I. THE DEBT SETTLEMENT INDUSTRY AND THE REGULATORY EFFORTS 
OF THE FEDERAL AND STATE GOVERNMENTS 
A. THE UNFAIR, DECEPTIVE, AND ABUSIVE PRACTICES OF DEBT 
SETTLEMENT COMPANIES 
Although debt settlement may seem like an attractive debt-relief 
option for many consumers, its benefits can only be realized if debt 
settlement companies engage in good faith practices.31 Several business 
and government entities have made inquiries into the debt settlement 
industry, and regrettably, almost all of these investigations have yielded 
troublesome discoveries.32 In 2005, the National Consumer Law Center 
(“NCLC”)33 issued a report questioning the value of debt settlement 
services.34 The NCLC accused companies of operating under a business 
                                                                                                                 
 31. See generally DEANNE LOONIN, NAT’L CONSUMER LAW CTR., AN 
INVESTIGATION OF DEBT SETTLEMENT COMPANIES: AN UNSETTLING BUSINESS FOR 
CONSUMERS (2005), http://www.nclc.org/images/pdf/debt_settlement/report_investigati 
on_debt_settle_co.pdf [http://perma.cc/XHB7-LS3N]; GAO Report, supra note 8 
(summarizing the harmful practices of debt settlement companies). 
 32. See infra notes 33-48 and accompanying text. 
 33. The NCLC is a non-profit consumer advocacy group that provides research 
assistance for consumer attorneys, writes manuals on law, and works with lawmakers to 
adopt laws and regulations that benefit and protect consumers. For Consumers, NAT’L 
CONSUMER LAW CTR., http://www.nclc.org/for-consumers/for-consumers.html [http://p 
erma.cc/8395-EG53]. 
 34. See generally LOONIN, supra note 31 (summarizing problems with debt 
settlement practices and recommending better enforcement of existing laws). 
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model that is “inherently harmful to consumers.”35 According to the 
NCLC, debt settlement companies actively target consumers who are 
insolvent or unable to afford their debts, but who are still able to pay 
something. 36  Ultimately, these targeted consumers spend the little 
money they have on hefty monthly payments and other administrative 
fees that the debt settlement companies charge for their services. 37 
Meanwhile, the debt settlement companies provide no tangible services 
that justify those fees.38 The NCLC reported that 43% of consumers 
cancelled their debt settlement programs after incurring such high fees, 
while only 1.4% of consumers were able to complete the program by 
paying off all of their debts.39 The NCLC also found that debt settlement 
companies are rarely upfront about the consequences of settling debts 
and often make false promises regarding the amount of debt reduction 
that they will reasonably be able to negotiate. 40  In addition, the 
companies require consumers to stop paying creditors, but do not 
counsel them on the consequences of delinquency. 41  The NCLC 
classified debt settlement as an abusive practice and ultimately 
recommended that any new laws should prohibit this business model 
entirely.42 
The Government Accountability Office (“GAO”) reached similar 
conclusions when the United States Senate Committee on Commerce, 
Science, and Transportation asked it to investigate debt settlement 
companies in 2010. 43  The GAO, like the NCLC, found that these 
companies charged advance fees before settling any debts,44 mandated 
consumers to stop paying creditors,45 falsely claimed that a large number 
of consumers completed their debt settlement programs, 46  and 
guaranteed minimum reductions in principal amounts of debt.47 Due to 
the fraudulent, abusive, and deceptive nature of these acts, the GAO 
                                                                                                                 
 35. Id. at 1. 
 36. Id. at 3-4. 
 37. Id. at 7. 
 38. Id. at 9-11. 
 39. Id. at 5. 
 40. Id. at 12-13. 
 41. Id. at 6-7. 
 42. Id. at 21. 
 43. GAO Report, supra note 8, at 7. 
 44. Id. at 7-9. 
 45. Id. at 9-10. 
 46. Id. at 10-13. 
 47. Id. at 13. 
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voiced concerns about the risk to consumers already in difficult financial 
situations.48 
Even consumers of these services have noticed that they have not 
been treated fairly: individuals have filed a substantial number of 
complaints against debt settlement companies in several states, and that 
number is only increasing.49 These individuals claimed that they did not 
obtain relief from their debts and that, as a result of engaging a debt 
settlement company for its services, ended up in worse financial 
circumstances than when they dealt with their debt on their own.50 
B. FEDERAL REGULATORY EFFORTS 
The federal government has attempted to eradicate corrupt debt 
settlement51 through the efforts of two federal agencies.52 They are the 
Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”) and the Consumer Financial 
Protection Bureau (“CFPB”), each of which is primarily tasked with 
consumer protection, but play different roles in the regulation process.53 
The FTC is empowered to regulate “unfair or deceptive acts or 
practices” (“UDAP”) of non-banks,54 while the CFPB may prohibit an 
“unfair, deceptive, or abusive act or practice” (“UDAAP”) in connection 
with consumer financial products or services. 55  The division of 
jurisdiction between the FTC and the CFPB works to ensure that debt 
settlement companies’ “services are fair, transparent, and competitive,” 
and that their business practices are not “anticompetitive, deceptive, or 
unfair to consumers.”56 Both the FTC and CFPB have taken regulatory 
steps against many debt settlement companies.57 
                                                                                                                 
 48. Id. at 7. 
 49. See NAAG Comment, supra note 7, at 1. 
 50. GAO Report, supra note 8, at 1. 
 51. See infra Section I.B. 
 52. See infra notes 54-55 and accompanying text. 
 53. See infra notes 54-55 and accompanying text. 
 54. See 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(2) (2012). 
 55. See 12 U.S.C. § 5531(a) (2012). 
 56. See Memorandum of Understanding, supra note 27, at 1; see also 12 U.S.C. § 
5581(b)(5) (detailing the authority of CFPB and FTC in relation to each other). 
 57. See infra, Part I.C.1-2; see also Complaint for Permanent Injunction and Other 
Equitable Relief, Fed. Trade Comm’n v. DebtPro 123 LLC, No. SACV 14-00693 JLS 
(ANx) (C.D. Cal. May 2, 2014), http://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/cases/1406 
03debtprocmpt.pdf [http://perma.cc/Y69T-BKF8]; Stipulated Final Judgment and 
Order, Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau v. Premier Consulting Grp. LLC, No. 1:13-cv-3064 
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1. The FTC 
Congress created the FTC in 1914 under the Federal Trade 
Commission Act (“FTCA”). 58  However, the FTC did not receive 
authority to protect consumers until 1938 when the Wheeler-Lea Act 
amended the FTCA. 59  The Wheeler-Lea Act authorized the FTC to 
declare acts or practices in, or affecting, commerce to be unlawful on the 
grounds that they are either unfair or deceptive. 60 The FTCA defines 
unfair acts or practices as those that cause substantial injury to, cannot 
be reasonably avoided by, and are not outweighed by countervailing 
benefits to consumers.61  Although “deception” is not defined by the 
FTCA, deceptive acts or practices are understood to be any material 
representation or omission that is likely to mislead a reasonable 
consumer.62 
Using its enforcement authority, 63  the FTC has initiated many 
actions against debt settlement companies for engaging in practices it 
considered unfair or deceptive.64 For instance, in May 2004, the FTC 
                                                                                                                 
(JLC) (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 4, 2014), http://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/201412_cfpb-cfpb-v-
premier-consulting-group-et-al-proposed-stipulated-final-judgment-and-order.pdf [http: 
//perma.cc/J58E-NT82]. 
 58. Federal Trade Commission Act of 1914, Pub. L. No. 63-203, 38 Stat. 717 
(codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 41-58). 
 59. Wheeler-Lea Act of 1938, Pub. L. No. 75-447, § 2, 52 Stat. 111, 111 (1938) 
(codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 45). 
 60. See 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(2). 
 61. See id. § 45(n). 
 62. See Letter from James C. Miller III, Chairman, Fed. Trade Comm’n, to John D. 
Dingell, Chairman, Comm. on Energy & Commerce, FTC Policy Statement on 
Deception (Oct. 14, 1983), http://www.ftc.gov/public-statements/1983/10/ftc-policy-
statement-deception [http://perma.cc/2QRT-7K47]. 
 63. 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(2). 
 64. See, e.g., Complaint For Injunctive and Other Equitable Relief, Fed. Trade 
Comm’n v. Edge Solutions, Inc., No. CV-07-4087 (JG) (AKT) (E.D.N.Y. Oct. 1, 
2007), http://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/cases/2007/10/071001edgesolut 
ionscmplt.pdf [http://perma.cc/EAL9-2HC9]; Complaint For Injunctive and Other 
Equitable Relief, Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Debt Set, Inc., 1:07-cv-00558-RPM (D. Colo. 
Mar. 20, 2007), http://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/cases/2007/03/070327 
cmp0623140.pdf [http://perma.cc/QPA3-KQGM]; Complaint For Injunctive and Other 
Equitable Relief, Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Connelly, No. SA CV 06-701 DOC (RNBx) 
(C.D. Cal. Aug. 3, 2006), http://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/cases/2006/0 
9/060921cmp0523091.pdf [http://perma.cc/M3VA-C2AJ]; Complaint For Injunctive 
and Other Equitable Relief, Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Innovative Sys. Tech., No. CV04-
0728 (GAF) (C.D. Cal. Feb. 6, 2004), http://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/ 
cases/2004/02/040213comp0323006.pdf [http://perma.cc/Z73D-3A9B]. 
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filed a complaint against a group of debt settlement companies that 
made over $84 million using UDAP.65 The complaint alleged that the 
defendants (1) falsely promised free debt counseling but then charged 
consumers excessive fees to enroll in their programs; (2) deceptively 
promised that the programs were certain to eliminate consumers’ debts; 
(3) failed to disclose that very few existing customers had been able to 
reduce their debts using their programs; and (4) failed to disclose that 
consumers would face financial consequences, such as late fees and 
lower credit ratings, as a result of enrolling in their programs.66 Each of 
the defendants agreed to settle the claims against them, and the FTC 
ordered them to make clear disclosures in all future transactions 
regarding their fees and the possible consequences clients might face if 
they followed a debt settlement program.67 The settlements also required 
the defendants to pay $1 million in consumer redress and a total of 
$3.821 million for equitable relief purposes.68 
The FTC filed a subsequent complaint in November 2004 against 
Better Budget Financial Services, a debt settlement company, and its 
principals.69 The FTC alleged that the defendants (1) charged consumers 
a monthly fee of $29.95 to $39.95, plus 25% of the difference between 
the principle amount owed and the settlement amount the company was 
able to negotiate; (2) advised consumers to stop paying their creditors 
and instead collect their savings in an account designated for eventual 
negotiated debt settlement, which was also the same account from which 
defendants withdrew their monthly fees; (3) promised to reduce 
consumer debt by 50% to 70% and shorten the time period necessary to 
pay off the debt; (4) promised to settle consumers’ debts with creditors 
once the consumers saved enough money in their accounts; (5) promised 
                                                                                                                 
 65. Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm’n, Debt Services Operations Settle FTC 
Charges (Mar. 30, 2005) [hereinafter Debt Services Operations Settle], http://www.ftc.g 
ov/news-events/press-releases/2005/03/debt-services-operations-settle-ftc-charges [http: 
//perma.cc/N6DJ-J7EG]; see also Settlement Agreement and [Proposed] Final Order for 
Permanent Injunction with Receivership Defendants, Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Nat’l 
Consumer Council, No. SA CV04-0474 (CJC) (JWJx) (C.D. Cal. Mar. 29, 2005), 
http://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/cases/2005/03/050330receivership032
3185.pdf [http://perma.cc/W3RS-3C56]. 
 66. Debt Services Operations Settle, supra note 65. In fact, only 638 of 44,844 
consumers actually completed a program. Id. 
 67. Id. 
 68. Id. 
 69. Id. 
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consumers that they could stop debt collection attempts by creditors; and 
(6) were, in reality, only able to settle the debts of very few consumers 
in their programs.70 The defendants made approximately $12 million in 
profit from these practices.71 Pursuant to a stipulated final order, the 
defendants were barred from fraudulently guaranteeing that a 
consumer’s debt could be reduced, settling with creditors once 
consumers accumulated specific amounts of money, and 
misrepresenting that they were able to stop collection efforts by 
creditors when, in fact, they were not.72 Defendants were also ordered to 
turn over approximately $1.3 million in assets for the purpose of 
consumer redress.73 Better Budget Financial Services has since ceased 
all operations of its debt settlement business.74 
In March 2006, the FTC filed a complaint against another 
company, Debt Solutions, Inc., and its affiliates, alleging that they 
falsely promised that participating consumers would (1) save thousands 
of dollars in a short time; (2) have their credit card and loan interest 
rates reduced substantially; (3) pay off their debt substantially faster 
without increasing monthly payments; (4) pay substantially reduced 
monthly payments to creditors; and (5) receive a guaranteed full refund 
if they did not save at least $2500 from their principal amount owed.75 
Consumers paid $399 to $629 for the program,76 and it is believed that 
                                                                                                                 
 70. Id. 
 71. Stipulated Final Judgment and Order for Permanent Injunction and Other 
Equitable Relief Against All Defendants at 16, Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Better Budget 
Fin. Serv., Inc., No. 04-CV-12326 (WGY) (D. Mass. Feb. 25, 2005), http://www.ftc.go 
v/sites/default/files/documents/cases/2005/03/050330ord0412326.pdf [http://perma.cc/S 
2PL-6NA6]. 
 72. Id. at 10-11. 
 73. Debt Services Operations Settle, supra note 65. 
 74. The date of Better Budget Financial Services’ involuntary dissolution was May 
31, 2007. Business Entity Summary: Better Budget Financial Services, Inc., SEC’Y 
COMMONWEALTH MASS., http://corp.sec.state.ma.us/CorpWeb/CorpSearch/CorpSumma 
ry.aspx?FEIN=043528837&SEARCH_TYPE=1 [http://perma.cc/8J62-A39U]. The fact 
that the company is no longer operating its debt settlement business is not much of a 
consolation for consumers because individual companies may always re-emerge under 
an altered name or different business model. See Franklin, supra note 5. 
 75. Complaint for Permanent Injunction and Other Relief at 7-9, Fed. Trade 
Comm’n v. Debt Solutions, Inc., No. CV06-0298 (JLR) (W.D. Wash. Mar. 6, 2006), 
http://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/cases/2006/03/060306cmplt0523002.p
df [http://perma.cc/R3HP-E2MT]. 
 76. Id. at 6. 
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the defendants made approximately $23 million from their activities.77 
Pursuant to a stipulated settlement, two principals of the defendant 
companies were permanently barred from engaging in the business of 
the debt-relief industry.78  In addition, all defendants were prohibited 
from engaging in any of the violations alleged in the complaint. 79 
However, no monetary redress was ordered because the defendants 
represented that they were unable to pay.80 Curiously, Debt Solutions, 
Inc. has managed to continue its operations as a debt settlement 
company, but today it is known under a different name: DSI Financial, 
Inc.81 
After years of addressing the UDAP of debt settlement companies 
on a case-by-case and company-by-company basis, 82  the FTC’s 
concerns about the harm that debt settlement plans caused consumers 
persisted.83 In response, the FTC undertook regulatory measures against 
the debt settlement industry.84 In 2009, the FTC exercised its authority 
under the Telemarketing and Consumer Fraud and Abuse Prevention 
Act85  to amend the Telemarketing Sales Rule.86  Amendments to the 
                                                                                                                 
 77. See Stipulated Final Judgment and Order for Permanent Injunction and Other 
Equitable Relief as to All Defendants at 11, Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Debt Solutions, 
Inc., No. CV06-0298JLR (W.D. Wash. May 22, 2007), http://www.ftc.gov/sites/default 
/files/documents/cases/2007/05/070522debtsolustipfnljdgmnt.pdf [http://perma.cc/6KX 
Q-5EZJ]. 
 78. Id. at 6. 
 79. See id. at 7-10. 
 80. Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm’n, Debt Elimination Defendants Settle FTC 
Charges (May 23, 2007), http://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2007/05/debt-
elimination-defendants-settle-ftc-charges [http://perma.cc/WZ67-NSL5]. 
 81. See Business Information Report: DSI Financial, Inc., PALM BEACH CTY. 
GOV’T, http://www.pbcgov.com/pubSafety/Consumer/asps/BusinessInformationReport. 
asp?hrfBusSeq=500581&hrfBusName=DSI%20Financial,%20Inc.&hrfProductSeq=0 
[http://perma.cc/TR67-NBJY]. 
 82. The FTC identifies twenty-three enforcement actions against debt relief 
companies leading up to the finalization of its amended Telemarketing Sales Rule. See 
Telemarketing Sales Rule, 75 Fed. Reg. 48,457, 48,509 (Aug. 10, 2010) (codified at 16 
C.F.R. pt. 310). But the FTC only brought seven actions against debt settlement 
companies between 2001 and 2009. See Telemarketing Sales Rule, 74 Fed. Reg. 
41,988, 41,996 (Aug. 19, 2009). 
 83. Telemarketing Sales Rule, 74 Fed. Reg. at 41,995. 
 84. Id. 
 85. Telemarketing and Consumer Fraud and Abuse Prevention Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 
6101-6108 (2012) (authorizing the FTC to propound rules governing abusive 
telemarketing activities); see Telemarketing Sales Rule, 74 Fed. Reg. at 41,989 
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Telemarketing Sales Rule are meant to increase the agency’s ability to 
prevent debt settlement companies from engaging in UDAP. 87  The 
amendments (1) prohibit debt settlement companies from charging fees 
before settling or reducing a consumer’s debt;88 (2) require companies to 
make four specific disclosures to consumers; 89 (3) prohibit 
misrepresentation;90  and (4) expand the rule to cover calls made by 
consumers to companies.91 Until the amended Telemarketing Sales Rule 
became effective in 2010, no federal regulation specifically addressed 
the UDAP of debt settlement companies.92 
2. The CFPB 
The CFPB, which was created in 2010 under the Dodd-Frank Wall 
Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (“Dodd-Frank Act”),93 has 
                                                                                                                 
(explaining that the Telemarketing and Consumer Fraud and Abuse Prevention Act 
directs the FTC to issue rules defining and prohibiting deceptive and abusive 
telemarketing acts or practices). 
 86. The Telemarketing Sales Rule was promulgated in 1995 pursuant to the FTC’s 
authority under the Telemarketing and Consumer Fraud and Abuse Prevention Act. 
Michael Thurman & Michael L. Mallow, “Hid[ing] Elephants in Mouseholes”: The 
FTC’s Unwarranted Attempt to Regulate the Debt-Relief-Services Industry Using 
Rulemaking Authority Purportedly Granted by the Telemarketing and Consumer Fraud 
and Abuse Prevention Act, 14 TEX. REV. L. & POL. 301, 318 (2010) (discussing how the 
FTC used its rulemaking authority under the Telemarketing and Consumer Fraud and 
Abuse Prevention Act to promulgate the Telemarketing Sales Rule on August 16, 
1995). 
 87. Id. at 327. 
 88. See Telemarketing Sales Rule, 75 Fed. Reg. at 48,469. 
 89. Id. at 48,491 (requiring companies to disclose “(1) the amount of time 
necessary to achieve the represented results; (2) the amount of savings needed before 
the settlement of a debt; (3) if the debt relief program includes advice or instruction to 
consumers not to make timely payments to creditors, that the program may affect the 
consumer’s creditworthiness, result in collection efforts, and increase the amount the 
consumer owes due to late fees and interest; and (4) if the debt relief provider requests 
or requires the consumer to place funds in a dedicated bank account at an insured 
financial institution, that the consumer owns the funds held in the account and may 
withdraw from the debt relief service at any time without penalty, and receive all funds 
in the account”). 
 90. Id. at 48,497. 
 91. Id. at 48,495. 
 92. See N.Y.C. BAR ASS’N, supra note 10, at 96. 
 93. See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 
111-203, §2(4), 124 Stat. 1376 (2010) (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5301 (2012)). 
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jurisdiction to regulate the activities of debt settlement companies.94 The 
CFPB’s chief purpose is to prohibit any UDAAP related to “a consumer 
financial product or service,” through enforcement actions and 
rulemaking. 95  The Consumer Financial Protection Act of 2010 
(“CFPA”)96 defines “unfair acts or practices” in the same way as does 
the FTCA.97 But again, the term “deceptive” is not statutorily defined. 
For the purposes of its statutory authority, the CFPB considers any 
material misrepresentation, omission, act, or practice that misleads, or is 
likely to mislead, a consumer to be deceptive, provided that the 
consumer’s interpretation is reasonable under the circumstances.98 The 
Dodd-Frank Act does, however, define the term “abusive”99 as any act 
or practice that either (1) materially interferes with the consumer’s 
ability to understand a term or condition of a consumer financial product 
or service; or (2) takes unreasonable advantage of the consumer’s lack 
of understanding of the material risks, costs, or conditions of the product 
or service, his inability to protect his interests in selecting or using the 
product or service, or his reasonable reliance on the company to act in 
his or her interest.100 
The CFPB has initiated over forty-six enforcement actions under its 
UDAAP authority since its inception. 101  These enforcement actions 
                                                                                                                 
 94. See generally Memorandum of Understanding, supra note 27 (agreement 
between FTC and CFPB to coordinate efforts to protect consumers and to avoid 
duplicative enforcement or regulatory efforts). 
 95. See 12 U.S.C. §§ 5531(a)-(b). 
 96. Consumer Financial Protection Act of 2010, tit. X, Pub. L. 111-203, 124 Stat. 
1955 (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5511). 
 97. Compare 15 U.S.C. § 45(n) (2012), with 12 U.S.C. § 5531(c) (both defining 
unfair acts or practices as those likely to cause substantial injury to consumers which is 
not reasonably avoidable by consumers and not outweighed by countervailing benefits 
to consumers or to competition). 
 98. See CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, CFPB SUPERVISION AND EXAMINATION 
MANUAL, at UDAAP 5-8 (2012), http://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/201210_cfpb_supe 
rvision-and-examination-manual-v2.pdf [http://perma.cc/BU95-BE59]. 
 99. See Adam D. Maarec & John C. Morton, A Survey of Activities Identified as 
Unfair, Deceptive or Abusive by the CFPB, 68 CONSUMER FIN. L. Q. REP. 19, 20 
(2014). 
 100. See 12 U.S.C. § 5531(d). 
 101. See Maarec & Morton, supra note 99, at 20 (noting that up until January 1, 
2014, the CFPB entered sixteen enforcement actions based on allegations of UDAAP). 
Since January 1, 2014, the CFPB has brought more than thirty enforcement actions 
under its UDAAP authority. See Newsroom: Enforcement, CONSUMER FIN. PROT. 
BUREAU, http://www.consumerfinance.gov/newsroom/?topic=enforcement [http://perm 
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mainly targeted marketing, debt collection, and mortgage loan 
servicing 102  rather than debt-relief services or debt settlement, 
specifically.103 However, the CFPB has not ignored the issues created by 
this industry entirely and has brought a few enforcement actions against 
debt settlement companies.104 These actions addressed the UDAAP of 
debt settlement companies under the CFPA,105 in addition to the acts or 
practices that the Telemarketing Sales Rule define as per se unfair or 
deceptive.106 For instance, the CFPB has commenced actions alleging 
that (1) knowingly charging monthly fees from consumers that the 
consumers were unable to afford is an abusive practice; 107  (2) 
                                                                                                                 
a.cc/6NRV-XEVH], for a listing of the CFPB’s enforcement actions. The CFPB has 
targeted a multitude of different practices under this authority. See, e.g., Stipulated 
Final Judgment and Consent Order 5-8, Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau v. Nat’l Corrective 
Group, Inc., No. 1:15-CV-899 (RDB) (D. Md. Mar. 30, 2015), http://files.consumerfina 
nce.gov/f/201503_cfpb_proposed-order-national-corrective-group.pdf [http://perma.cc/ 
E4P5-A2CN] (enjoining defendants from UDAAP, including masquerading as district 
attorneys to threaten consumers with criminal charges to deceive them into paying extra 
fees for financial education class); Complaint at 5, Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau v. All 
Fin. Serv., LLC, Case No. 1:15-CV-00420-JFM (D. Md. Feb. 12, 2015) (alleging that 
defendant disseminated deceptive and misleading advertisements suggesting that it was 
affiliated with government agency); Stipulated Final Judgment and Order, Consumer 
Fin. Prot. Bureau v. Freedom Stores, Inc., No. 2:14CV643 (ANA)(TEM) (E.D. Va. 
Dec. 18, 2014) (enjoining defendants from unfair and abusive practices, including 
illegally filing lawsuits in Virginia for out-of-state contracts to obtain default judgments 
and illegally debiting bank accounts of consumers’ family and friends). 
 102. See Maarec & Morton, supra note 99, at 20. 
 103. The CFPB has only recently begun to accept complaints against debt settlement 
companies. See CFPB Begins Accepting Consumer Complaints on Prepaid Cards and 
Additional Nonbank Products, CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU (Jul. 21, 2014), 
http://www.consumerfinance.gov/newsroom/cfpb-begins-accepting-consumer-complain 
ts-on-prepaid-cards-and-additional-nonbank-products/ [http://perma.cc/8U6M-FU3G]. 
For a list of the CFPB’s latest priorities, see Fall 2015 Statement of Regulatory 
Priorities, CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, http://www.reginfo.gov/public/jsp/eAgenda/ 
StaticContent/201510/Statement_3170.html [http://perma.cc/2SHU-MW4J] (excluding 
debt settlement companies as a priority). 
 104. See, e.g., Complaint, Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau v. Am. Debt Settlement 
Sols., Inc., No. 9:13-cv-80548-DMM (S.D. Fla. May 30, 2013), http://files.consumerfin 
ance.gov/f/201305_cfpb_complaint_adss.pdf [http://perma.cc/NDD4-JVR8]. 
 105. See infra notes 107-09 and accompanying text. 
 106. See Telemarketing Sales Rule, 75 Fed. Reg. 48,457, 48,458 (Aug. 10, 2010) 
(summarizing the amendments to the Telemarketing Sales Rule that apply to debt 
settlement practices, including ban on advanced fees, requirement of specific 
disclosures, and prohibition of specific misrepresentations about debt settlement 
programs). 
 107. See Complaint, supra note 104, at 13-15. 
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representing that the company is affiliated with the government is a 
deceptive practice;108 and (3) preventing consumers from learning about 
the risks, costs, and conditions associated with debt settlement programs 
by concealing fees or dodging questions is an unfair practice.109 
C. STATE REGULATORY EFFORTS 
Unfortunately, the federal government’s stance against debt 
settlement companies has allowed for many regulatory loopholes. 110 
Since the FTC’s rulemaking authority under the Telemarketing Sales 
Rule is limited to telemarketing,111 the Rule, as amended in 2010, only 
covers debt settlement companies’ transactions through telemarketing 
services.112 In addition, the CFPB heavily relies on consumers to report 
the UDAAP of debt settlement companies in order to undertake 
enforcement actions.113 States have tried to protect their citizens against 
debt settlement companies by filling in these loopholes with their own 
consumer protection laws and enforcement actions. 
Although every state has an interest in protecting its consumers 
from debt settlement companies, each state varies in its method of 
protection. 114  For example, a few states regulate debt settlement 
                                                                                                                 
 108. See Complaint at 10-11, Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau v. Mission Settlement 
Agency, No. 13 CV 3064 (S.D.N.Y. May 7, 2013), http://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/2 
01305_cfpb_complaint_mission-settlement.pdf [http://perma.cc/6Z4A-YHM2]. 
 109. Id. at 7-9. 
 110. See Elizabeth Ody, Debt Settlement Firms Outfox the Regulators, 
BLOOMBERGBUSINESS (Nov. 3, 2011), http://www.bloomberg.com/bw/magazine/debt-
settlement-firms-outfox-the-regulators-11032011.html [http://perma.cc/B87X-C6Z7]. 
 111. See Thurman & Mallow, supra note 86, at 320. The FTC’s jurisdiction over 
debt settlement companies is limited to those companies that make outbound calls to 
solicit consumers and receive inbound calls from consumers responding to general 
media advertisements. See Telemarketing Sales Rule, 75 Fed. Reg. at 48,495. 
 112. See Telemarketing Sales Rule, 75 Fed. Reg. at 48,466; N.Y.C. BAR ASS’N, 
supra note 10, at 95. 
 113. See Justin P. Nelson, Note, Federal Oversight of the Debt Relief Industry: A 
More Effective Means of Deterring Illegal Debt Settlement Schemes, 75 OHIO ST. L. J. 
FURTHERMORE 42, 57 (2014). 
 114. See GAO Report, supra note 8, at 6. For further information on state legislation 
regarding the debt relief industry, see the National Conference of State Legislatures, 
which tracks the statutory citations and policies of each state, at http://www.ncsl.org/res 
earch/financial-services-and-commerce/credit-counseling-debt-managem983and-settle 
m983.aspx [http://perma.cc/ATK5-YPFS]. 
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companies through legislation that bans UDAP,115 while others ban debt 
settlement companies altogether.116 Some states require debt settlement 
companies to obtain licenses,117 and some states cap the amount debt 
settlement companies may charge for their services.118 States may also 
                                                                                                                 
 115. See, e.g., CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 17200 (West, Westlaw through 2015 
Sess.) (prohibiting unfair competition, including “any unlawful, unfair or fraudulent 
business act or practice and unfair, deceptive, untrue or misleading advertising.”); FLA. 
STAT. ANN. § 501.204 (West, Westlaw through 2015 portion of 2015-2016 Legis. Sess.) 
(“Unfair methods of competition, unconscionable acts or practices, and unfair or 
deceptive acts or practices in the conduct of any trade or commerce are hereby declared 
unlawful.”); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 325F.69 (West, Westlaw through 2015 legislation) 
(prohibiting fraud, misrepresentation, and deceptive practices); N.Y. GEN. BUS. LAW § 
349 (McKinney, Westlaw through 2015 Sess.) (“Deceptive acts or practices in the 
conduct of any business, trade or commerce or in the furnishing of any service in this 
state are hereby declared unlawful.”). 
 116. See, e.g., ARK. CODE. ANN. § 5-63-302(a) (West, Westlaw through 2015 
legislation) (“A person shall not engage in, or offer to or attempt to engage in, the 
business or practice of debt adjusting in this state.”); HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 446-2 
(West, Westlaw through 2015 Sess.) (“Any person who acts or offers to act as a debt 
adjuster in this State shall be fined . . . or imprisoned . . . .”); LA. STAT. ANN. § 14:331 
(Westlaw through 2015 Sess.) (“Except as otherwise provided herein, no person shall 
engage in the business of debt adjusting.”); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 17:16G-2(a) (West, 
Westlaw through 2015 Sess.) (“No person other than a nonprofit social service agency 
or a nonprofit consumer credit counseling agency shall act as a debt adjuster.”); WYO. 
STAT. ANN. § 33-14-102(a) (West, Westlaw through 2015 Sess.) (“It shall be unlawful 
for any person to engage in the business of debt adjusting.”). 
 117. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 36a-671(b) (West, Westlaw through 2015 
Sess.); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 26-2223 (West, Westlaw through 2015 portion of 2015-
2016 Legis. Sess.); N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. § 13-11-02 (West, Westlaw through 2015 
Sess.); VT. STAT. ANN. tit 8, § 2752 (West, Westlaw through 2015 portion of 2015-
2016 Legis. Sess.). 
 118. See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 18-5-2 (West, Westlaw through 2015 Sess.) 
(limiting fees to “7.5 percent of the amount paid monthly by such debtor to such person 
for distribution to creditors of such debtor.”); 225 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 429/125 
(West, Westlaw through 2015 Sess.) (limiting fees to one-time enrollment fee of $50 
and settlement fee of 15% of the savings); ME. REV. STAT. tit. 32, § 6174-A (Westlaw 
through 2015 portion of 2015-2016 Legis. Sess.) (limiting fees to one-time initial fee of 
$75 and either a $40 monthly fee or a reasonable settlement fee of 15% of the savings); 
N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. § 13-11-21 (West, Westlaw through 2015 Sess.) (prohibiting 
enrollment fees, and limiting settlement fees to thirty percent of the savings); W. VA. 
CODE ANN. § 61-10-23 (West, Westlaw through 2015 legislation) (limiting fees to two 
percent of total amount of money deposited into account for purpose of distributing the 
funds to creditors). 
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provide a combination of injunctive relief, civil penalties, and criminal 
implications for any violations of their consumer protection laws.119 
Although the general trend has been increased regulation of debt 
settlement companies by states, Pennsylvania is one of the few that has 
relaxed restrictions on debt settlement companies in the last few years.120 
Before November 1, 2014, debt settlement companies operating in 
Pennsylvania were subject to the Debt Management Services Act, which 
prohibited fees other than a $50 initial consultation fee, a $50 total 
monthly fee, and a $50 penalty fee for insufficient funds.121 Today, those 
companies are subject to the Debt Settlement Services Act, which 
allows companies to charge fees as long as they have settled at least one 
account in a consumer’s debt settlement plan, that consumer has made at 
least one payment in the plan, and the fee per debt settled is a proportion 
of the total fee for settling the debt as required by the law, or is a 
percentage of the amount saved.122 Although debt settlement companies 
are free to charge more fees for their services, they are still subject to 
specific disclosure requirements and prohibited from 
misrepresentations.123 
                                                                                                                 
 119. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 501.207 (West, Westlaw through 2015 portion of 
2015-2016 Legis. Sess.) (providing injunctive relief); id. § 501.2075 (imposing a 
penalty of up to $10,000 for each violation of Florida Deceptive and Unfair Trade 
Practices Act); HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 446-2 (West, Westlaw through 2015 Sess.) 
(“Any person who acts or offers to act as a debt adjuster in this State shall be fined not 
more than $500 or imprisoned not more than sixth months, or both.”); N.D. CENT. CODE 
ANN. § 13-11-27 (West, Westlaw through 2015 Sess.) (imposing civil money penalty of 
$5000 per violation and class C felony charge); S.C. CODE ANN. § 37-7-117 (Westlaw 
through 2015 Sess.) (“A person who violates [the consumer credit counseling chapter] 
is guilty of a misdemeanor and, upon conviction, must be fined not more than five 
hundred dollars or imprisoned not more than six months, or both.”); VT. STAT. ANN. tit 
8, § 2764 (West, Westlaw through 2015 portion of 2015-2016 Legis. Sess.) (“Any 
person . . . who shall violate . . . any of the provisions of this chapter, shall be 
imprisoned not more than two years or fined not more than $1500.00, or both.”). 
 120. Debt Management Services Act, 2008 PA. LEGIS. SERV. 2008-117 (West) 
(requiring stricter regulation of debt management services), repealed by Debt 
Settlement Services Act, 2014 PA. LEGIS. SERV. 2014-118 (West) (relaxing the 
regulation of debt settlement providers). 
 121. 63 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. § 2415 (West, Westlaw through 2015 
Sess.), held unconstitutional by U.S. Orgs. for Bankr. Alts., Inc. v. Dep’t of Banking, 
991 A.2d 370, 375 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2010). 
 122. 63 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. § 2552(c) (West, Westlaw through 2015 
Sess.). 
 123. Id. § 2552(a). 
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Using the enforcement authority delegated by these state consumer 
protection laws, state attorneys general and other state authorities have 
brought enforcement proceedings against debt settlement companies 
nationwide.124  For example, in 2009, the Colorado Attorney General 
brought enforcement actions against eleven debt settlement companies 
after receiving twenty-seven consumer complaints.125 These companies 
violated the Colorado consumer protection laws by failing to be 
registered, charging illegal fees, withholding necessary disclosures, and 
refusing consumers the right to cancel contracts. 126  The eleven 
companies settled, refunding $923,370 in program fees to 912 Colorado 
customers. 127  Since the adoption of the Colorado Debt Management 
Services Act in 2007, the Colorado Attorney General has initiated at 
least fifteen enforcement proceedings against debt settlement 
companies.128 
In January 2010, the Vermont Attorney General successfully 
obtained an assurance of discontinuance against Debt Settlement 
America, Inc.129 The Texas-based company earned at least $69,000 from 
                                                                                                                 
 124. In Georgia, the Governor’s Office of Consumer Protection enforces the Debt 
Adjustment Act. See Statutes We Enforce, GA. DEP’T OF L., http://consumer.georgia.go 
v/about-us/statutes-we-enforce [http://perma.cc/AA2Y-CLEL]. In South Carolina, the 
Department of Consumer Affairs enforces the South Carolina Consumer Protection 
Code. See About SCDCA, S.C. DEP’T OF CONSUMER AFF., http://www.consumer.sc.gov/ 
AboutUs/Pages/default.aspx [http://perma.cc/S5J2-26ND]. In North Dakota, both the 
Commissioner and Attorney General have the power to enforce the statute regulating 
debt settlement providers. N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. §§ 13-11-26 to 13-11-27 (West, 
Westlaw through 2015 Sess.). 
 125. See Marija Vader, Eleven Debt Management Companies Settle with A.G., 
COLO. SPRINGS. BUS. J. (Mar. 12, 2009), http://www.csbj.com/2009/03/12/eleven-debt-
management-companies-settle-with-ag/ [http:// perma.cc/52L8-M4PV]. 
 126. Id. 
 127. Id. 
 128. See, e.g., Annual Report 2011, COLO. ATT’Y GEN., http://coag.gov/sites/default/ 
files/contentuploads/ago/AnnualReport/2011%20Annual%20Report.pdf [http://perma.c 
c/7KKM-QM98]; Annual Report 2012, COLO. ATT’Y GEN., http://coag.gov/sites/default 
/files/contentuploads/ago/AnnualReport/2012%20Annual%20Report.pdf [http://perma. 
cc/W8TK-ECPZ]; Annual Report 2013, COLO. ATT’Y GEN., http://coag.gov/sites/defaul 
t/files/contentuploads/ago/AnnualReport/2013%20Annual%20Report%20Annual%20F
INAL.pdf [http://perma.cc/7YCA-UN4S; Annual Report 2014, COLO. ATT’Y GEN., 
http://coag.gov/sites/default/files/contentuploads/ago/AnnualReport/2014_DOL_Annua
l_Report.pdf [http://perma.cc/T5LW-24GP]. 
 129. Assurance of Discontinuance, In re Debt Settlement Am., Inc., No. 56-1-
10WNCV (Vt. Super. Ct. Jan. 27, 2010), http://ago.vermont.gov/assets/files/Debt%20S 
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twenty-five Vermont consumers.130  The company violated the state’s 
Consumer Fraud Act prohibitions on unfair and deceptive consumer acts 
and practices by charging customers upfront fees, making false 
representations, and failing to give customers the right to cancel 
contracts.131 Debt Settlement America, Inc. agreed to comply with the 
state’s Consumer Fraud Act, refund all Vermont customers, pay $2000 
to any customer who was sued by a creditor while enrolled in the 
company’s program, and pay $50,000 in civil penalties and costs.132 
Since February 2009, the Vermont Attorney General has initiated 
fourteen enforcement actions against all debt adjusters, including debt 
settlement companies.133 
In June 2011, the Florida Attorney General settled the case against 
Specialized Funding, Inc.134 Consumers complained that the company 
misled them about the true cost and length of the company’s debt 
settlement program, and charged fees before settling any debts; the 
Florida Attorney General’s office found both actions to be a violation of 
the Florida Deceptive and Unfair Trade Practices Act.135 The company, 
in addition to being restrained from any further violations of the Florida 
Deceptive and Unfair Trade Practices Act and the FTC’s Telemarketing 
Sales Rule, was ordered to cease all operations, refund $70,000 to 
seventy-three Florida consumers, and pay $20,000 for investigative 
costs.136 Since January 2011, the Florida Attorney General has initiated 
numerous consumer protection-related enforcement proceedings.137 
State statutory regulations and enforcement actions by state 
attorneys general may have helped regulate some debt settlement 
                                                                                                                 
ettlement%20America%20AOD%20-%202010-1-27.pdf [http://perma.cc/K2GB-
T8SQ]. 
 130. Id. at 1. 
 131. Id. at 2. 
 132. Id. at 3-4. 
 133. See Debt Adjusters, VT. OFFICE OF THE ATT’Y GEN., http://ago.vermont.gov/foc 
us/consumer-info/money-and-credit/debt-adjusters.php [http://perma.cc/QJ6K-NQXQ]. 
 134. See Assurance of Voluntary Compliance, In re Specialized Funding, Inc., L08-
3-1208 (June 14, 2011), http://www.myfloridalegal.com/EC_Edoc.nsf/0/FFF05906658 
FAF2C85257B10006E9CB2/$file/Specialized+Funding.pdf [http://perma.cc/8R75-WV 
M6]. 
 135. See id. at 2. 
 136. Id. at 5-9. 
 137. Settlements, Final Judgments, and Filed Complaints, FLA. OFFICE OF THE 
ATT’Y GEN., http://www.myfloridalegal.com/EC_Edoc.nsf/Enforcement [http://perma.c 
c/AY5T-HCH9]. 
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companies, but the overall impact has been negligible. 138  Most debt 
settlement companies are national and impact consumers from multiple 
states. 139  As illustrated above, state attorneys general only have the 
ability to enforce state consumer protection laws on behalf of the 
citizens of their own state. 140  With the limited reach of every state 
attorney general, and the variations in methods of consumer protection 
within each state, debt settlement companies are able to slip through the 
cracks of state legislative regimes.141 
D. PRIVATE REGULATORY EFFORTS 
Private actions by individual consumers can be a way to fortify the 
regulatory efforts of state and federal legislatures against the UDAAP of 
debt settlement companies.142 For example, in Davis v. Global Client 
                                                                                                                 
 138. See Nelson, supra note 113, at 50-53. 
 139. See, e.g., About CuraDebt, CURADEBT.COM, http://www.curadebt.com/about.as 
p [http://perma.cc/24F7-LZVF] (CuraDebt is a debt settlement company located in 
Florida, but services consumers nationwide); All About Debtmerica, DEBTMERICA.COM, 
http://debtmerica.com/about-us [http://perma.cc/24F7-LZVF] (Debtmerica is a 
California debt settlement company that works with consumers nationwide); Who We 
Are: About Freedom Debt Relief, FREEDOMDEBTRELIEF.COM, http://www.freedomdebtr 
elief.com/about?utm_medium=organic&utm_source=fdrsite&utm_campaign=freedomd
ebtrelief.com [http://perma.cc/DZ6A-T84S] (Freedom Debt Relief is a debt settlement 
company with 80,000 customers “spread widely across the United States.”); see also 
N.Y.C. BAR ASS’N, supra note 10, at 169-70 (according to the complaints received by 
the New York Attorney General and the New York Department of Consumer Affairs, 
debt settlement companies from at least 28 states have conducted business with New 
York citizens). 
 140. See supra notes 124-37 and accompanying text. 
 141. See supra notes 138-40 and accompanying text. 
 142. Many states authorize their citizens to file lawsuits against debt settlement 
companies under their consumer protection statutes. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. ANN. § 
45.50.531 (West, Westlaw through 2015 portion of 2015-2016 Legis. Sess.) (“A person 
who suffers an ascertainable loss of money or property as a result of another person’s 
act or practice declared unlawful by AS 45.50.471 may bring a civil action to recover 
for each unlawful act or practice . . . .”); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 501.211 (West, Westlaw 
through 2015 portion of 2015-2016 Legis. Sess.) (allowing consumers to bring action to 
obtain declaratory judgment or injunction against any act or practice that violates the 
Florida Deceptive and Unfair Trade Practices Act); 225 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 
429/155(b) (West, Westlaw through 2015 Sess.) (providing consumers the ability to 
bring a civil action in accordance with the Consumer Fraud and Deceptive Business 
Practices Act); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 380.110 (West, Westlaw through 2015 Sess.) 
(“Any person who enters into a debt-adjusting transaction and thereby suffers any 
ascertainable loss of money or property, real or personal, as a result of a violation of 
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Solutions, LLC,143 two Kentucky residents sued an account managing 
company that worked in conjunction with debt settlement companies for 
violations of Kentucky’s Debt Adjustment Act 144  and Consumer 
Protection Act. 145  Unfortunately, the financial circumstances of 
consumers dealing with debt settlement companies make it difficult for 
them to sue companies for harmful practices.146 
In addition to suing debt settlement companies for violating 
consumer protection statutes using a private right of action, consumers 
in financial distress have also fought against debt settlement companies 
by claiming fraudulent transfers in bankruptcy proceedings.147  Under 
section 548 of the Bankruptcy Code, a bankruptcy trustee may avoid any 
transfer of a debtor’s property made within two years of filing for 
bankruptcy if the debtor “received less than a reasonably equivalent 
value in exchange for such transfer.”148 
For example, in the bankruptcy proceeding of Leonard W. May and 
Judith L. May, the debtors engaged the services of Legal Helpers Debt 
Resolution, LLC around February 15, 2010.149 The debtors paid the debt 
settlement company approximately $6500 in fees, but the company 
performed no services in consideration.150 Since the debtors received 
less than a reasonably equivalent value in exchange for the payment 
                                                                                                                 
this chapter, may bring an action . . . to recover actual damages.”); N.Y. GEN. BUS. LAW 
§ 349(h) (McKinney, Westlaw through 2015 Sess.) (providing a private right of action 
for consumers injured by deceptive acts or practices). 
 143. See Davis v. Glob. Client Sols., LLC, 765 F. Supp. 2d 937 (W.D. Ky. 2011). 
Although the consumers initiated this case in federal court, the case was dismissed 
because the court recognized that the consumers agreed to arbitrate any claims against 
the debt settlement companies. Id. at 942. 
 144. KY. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 380.010-990 (West, Westlaw through 2015 Sess.). 
 145. Id. §§ 367.110-360. 
 146. See N.Y.C. BAR ASS’N, supra note 10, at 72 n.397 (noting the few number of 
cases in Westlaw that are brought by consumers, either individually or as class action). 
 147. See Steve Rhode, Are You at Risk of Refunds Back Two Years if Your Debt 
Settlement Clients File Bankruptcy? Legal Helpers Debt Resolution Judgment Says 
Yes., GETOUTOFDEBT.ORG (Mar. 19, 2011), http://getoutofdebt.org/26906/are-you-at-
risk-of-refunds-back-two-years-if-your-debt-settlement-clients-file-bankruptcy-legal-
helpers-debt-resolution-judgment-says-yes [http://perma.cc/FZX6-NCQW] (discussing 
liabilities for debt settlement companies who are vulnerable to bankruptcy trustees who 
can recover money for debt relief services within two years of debtor’s bankruptcy 
filing). 
 148. 11 U.S.C. § 548(a)(1)(B)(i) (2012). 
 149. See Rhode, supra note 147. 
 150. Id. 
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provided to the debt settlement company, the court found that the $6500 
was recoverable by the bankruptcy trustee and entered judgment in favor 
of the debtors in the amount of $6500, plus costs of the suit.151  In 
contrast, in an Eighth Circuit case where a trustee sought to recover 
$1708.37 on the basis of fraudulent transfer, the court held that even 
though the debt settlement company was engaged in prohibited debt 
adjusting under North Dakota law (making the contract void or illegal), 
there was value to the contract and the debt settlement company’s 
services; therefore, recovery was unwarranted.152 Individual consumers, 
just like the FTC, CFPB, and state attorneys general, are limited in their 
ability to fight against debt settlement companies.153 
II. PERSISTENT PROBLEMS IN THE DEBT SETTLEMENT INDUSTRY 
DESPITE REGULATORY EFFORTS 
Despite the enforcement actions and regulatory efforts by the FTC, 
the CFPB, states, and individual consumers to temper the unfair or 
deceptive practices of debt settlement companies, these companies 
continue to commit harmful practices. 154  While the FTC’s amended 
Telemarketing Sales Rule has prevented some debt settlement 
companies from engaging in these practices, some companies have 
ignored the Rule by making misrepresentations or continuing to charge 
large upfront fees before any debts are settled.155 
For example, in May 2013, almost three years after the 
amendments took effect,156 the CFPB brought an enforcement action 
                                                                                                                 
 151. Id.; see also Order for Default Judgment, In re May, No. 10-74328 (Bankr. 
N.D. Ill. Jan. 31, 2011). 
 152. See In re Kendall, 440 B.R. 526, 528, 530, 534 (B.A.P. 8th Cir. 2010) (holding 
that there is value as long as “there is some chance that a contemplated investment will 
generate a positive return at the time of the disputed transfer.”). 
 153. See supra notes 142-52 and accompanying text. 
 154. Cf. Nelson, supra note 113, at 51 (arguing that the reason debt settlement 
companies continue to disregard regulations is because consumers rarely file lawsuits 
against them). 
 155. See Debt Settlement Agencies Create Far More Consumer Problems Than They 
Solve, CONSUMER FED’N OF AM. (Nov. 10, 2014), http://consumerfed.org/press_release/ 
debt-settlement-agencies-create-far-more-consumer-problems-than-they-solve/ [http://p 
erma.cc/B3QV-9HRH] (recommending that State and Federal Agencies should take 
further action beyond enforcing the Telemarketing Sales Rule in order to curb debt 
settlement companies that are continuing harmful practices). 
 156. The amended Telemarketing Sales Rule that defines debt relief services, 
prohibits debt relief providers from collecting upfront fees, require disclosures of 
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against American Debt Settlement Solutions, Inc. (“ADSS”) and its 
owner for violating the Telemarketing Sales Rule, among other 
regulatory rules.157 ADSS charged consumers an initial enrollment fee, a 
monthly service fee, and represented that it could eliminate unsecured 
debt unreasonably quickly.158 In May 2014, the FTC took action against 
DebtPro 123 LLC and its affiliates for similar indiscretions. 159  The 
defendants had made false promises to resolve 30% to 70% of the 
original debt amount within, at most, thirty-six months, and charged 
upfront fees of 10% of the consumers’ total debt in clear violation of the 
Telemarketing Sales Rule.160 
While these and other debt settlement companies are blatantly 
ignoring statutory prohibitions, others are trying to find loopholes to 
evade state and federal regulations. 161  The business models of debt 
settlement companies have been adapting to regulators’ efforts to check 
fraud and deception, and to protect consumers.162 Some companies have 
tried to affiliate with lawyers in order to charge upfront fees163 in states 
that exempt lawyers from their debt settlement statutes.164 This strategy 
is especially popular because the amended Telemarketing Sales Rule 
                                                                                                                 
material information, etc., took effect on September 27, 2010, except for Section 
310.4(a)(5), which became effective on October 27, 2010. See Telemarketing Sales 
Rule, 75 Fed. Reg. 48,457, 48,458 (Aug. 10, 2010). 
 157. See Complaint at 1, Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau v. Am. Debt Settlement Sols., 
Inc., No. 9:13-cv-80548-DMM (S.D. Fla. May 30, 2013), http://files.consumerfinance.g 
ov/f/201305_cfpb_complaint_adss.pdf [http://perma.cc/KZW5-F6LC]. 
 158. Id. at 4-6. 
 159. See Complaint for Permanent Injunction and Other Equitable Relief at 1-2, 4-6, 
Fed. Trade Comm’n v. DebtPro 123 LLC, No. SACV 14-00693 JLS (ANx) (C.D. Cal. 
May 2, 2014), http://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/cases/140603debtprocmpt.pd 
f [http://perma.cc/C92V-MHFS]. 
 160. Id. at 9, 12. 
 161. See Connie Prater, States, Feds Target Debt Settlement Legal Firms Over 
Upfront Fees, CREDITCARDS.COM (Apr. 12, 2012), http://www.creditcards.com/credit-
card-news/debt_settlement-upfront-fees-banned-law-firms-1282.php [http://perma.cc/Y 
P3E-SJ8X]. 
 162. See N.Y.C. BAR ASS’N, supra note 10, at 95. 
 163. See Ody, supra note 110; Prater, supra note 161. 
 164. See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 18-5-3 (West, Westlaw through 2015 Sess.) 
(creating exemptions for “those situations involving debt adjusting incurred in the 
practice of law in this state”). 
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includes no specific prohibition for lawyers.165 Other creative business 
practices targeted at evading state and federal regulations are: (1) 
meeting with clients face to face when signing documents;166 (2) web-
based marketing;167 and (3) changing company names to start on a clean 
slate.168 
The efforts by consumers and enforcement officials to sue debt 
settlement companies that conducted unfair or deceptive business 
practices have been inadequate to curb these predatory practices in the 
industry. 169  Despite the current civil penalties for violating the 
Telemarketing Sales Rule, 170  the CFPA, 171  and individual state 
regulations,172  the penalties for engaging in these practices are often 
substantially smaller than the total amount of fees a company can collect 
from consumers by using these practices.173 For example, the California 
Attorney General sued Freedom Debt Relief, LLC and its two 
                                                                                                                 
 165. See Ody, supra note 110; see generally Telemarketing Sales Rule, 75 Fed. Reg. 
48,457 (Aug. 10, 2010) (providing no prohibition against lawyers charging upfront fees 
in relation to debt settlement services). 
 166. See Ody, supra note 110; Prater, supra note 161. 
 167. Prater, supra note 161. 
 168. In some cases, once a state attorney general or the FTC has taken enforcement 
action to enjoin UDAP of individual companies, they re-emerge as another company 
under a different name. See id. 
 169. N.Y.C. BAR ASS’N, supra note 10, at 75. 
 170. Debt settlement companies must pay a civil penalty of $16,000 for each 
violation. See Complying with the Telemarketing Sales Rule, FED. TRADE COMM’N, 
http://www.ftc.gov/tips-advice/business-center/guidance/complying-telemarketing-sales 
-rule#penalties [http://perma.cc/L3ZU-7SLF]. 
 171. See 12 U.S.C. § 5565(c)(2) (2012) (setting forth civil penalties depending on 
the type of violation: $5000 per day for violations of written law, rule or final order; 
$25,000 per day for reckless violations of consumer financial law; and $1 million per 
day for knowing violations of consumer financial law). 
 172. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 36a-665 (West, Westlaw through 2015 
Sess.) (imposing a civil penalty of not more than $1000 for violations of a statute 
regulating debt adjusters and debt negotiation); GA. CODE ANN. § 18-5-4 (West, 
Westlaw through 2015 Sess.) (“Any person who engages in debt adjusting . . . shall 
further be liable for a civil fine of not less than $50,000.00; and . . . shall further be 
liable to the debtor in an amount equal to the total of all fees, charges, or contributions 
paid by the debtor plus $5000.00.”); 225 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 429/80 (West, 
Westlaw through 2015 Sess.) (imposing civil penalty of $10,000 per violation of Debt 
Settlement Consumer Protection Act); N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. § 13-11-27 (West, 
Westlaw through 2015 Sess.) (granting the commissioner power to impose a civil 
penalty up to $5000 per violation); id. § 13-11-29 (consumers may recover the greater 
of actual restitution or $2000, plus costs, expenses, and reasonable attorney’s fees). 
 173. See N.Y.C. BAR ASS’N, supra note 10, at 73. 
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founders.174 The company made approximately $150 million from illegal 
practices, and even though the court found in favor of the plaintiff, 
Freedom Debt Relief was only ordered to pay $950,000 in penalties—a 
pittance in comparison to its illegal earnings.175 Freedom Debt Relief, 
LLC continues its operations today and is even advertised as the second-
ranking debt settlement company, 176  having helped approximately 
250,000 consumers through its debt settlement programs.177 Even so, the 
company continues to attract complaints from consumers.178 
Despite having been sued on multiple occasions by the CFPB and 
individual consumers for harmful practices, the company Global Client 
Solutions, LLC has also been undeterred by judgments against it.179 
Notwithstanding an order to pay millions of dollars in civil penalties,180 
Global Client Solutions continues its business operations in account 
management services.181 The problem is that the enforcement of federal 
                                                                                                                 
 174. Id. (discussing the complaint in California v. Freedom Debt Relief, No. 
CIV477991 (Cal. Super. Ct. Oct. 30, 2008)). 
 175. Id. (discussing the consent judgment in California v. Freedom Debt Relief, No. 
CIV477991 (Cal. Super. Ct. Dec. 16, 2009)). For further examples, see supra Part I.C.1. 
 176. See 2016 Best Debt Settlement Review, TOPTENREVIEWS.COM, http://debt-settle 
ment-review.toptenreviews.com/ [http://perma.cc/82E5-MT9T]. 
 177. See Who We Are: About Freedom Debt Relief, FREEDOMDEBTRELIEF.COM, 
http://www.freedomdebtrelief.com/about?utm_medium=organic&utm_source=fdrsite&
utm_campaign=freedomdebtrelief.com [http://perma.cc/FHM3-WSNS]. 
 178. See BBB Business Review: Freedom Debt Relief, LLC, BETTER BUSINESS 
BUREAU, http://www.bbb.org/greater-san-francisco/business-reviews/credit-debt-consol 
idation-services/freedom-debt-relief-in-san-mateo-ca-65019/complaints#breakdown 
[http://perma.cc/S9U6-UPTD]. 
 179. See, e.g., Complaint, Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau v. Glob. Client Sols., LLC, 
No. 2:14-CV-6643 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 25, 2014), http://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/20140 
8_cfpb_complaint_global-client-solutions.pdf [http://perma.cc/X3QG-XXBV]; Estrella 
v. Freedom Fin. Network, LLC, 2012 WL 4645012 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 1, 2012) (No. 09-
CV-3156); Guidotti v. Legal Helpers Debt Resolution, LLC, 866 F. Supp. 2d 315 
(D.N.J. 2011). 
 180. See, e.g., Stipulated Final Judgment and Consent Order at 14, 16, Consumer 
Fin. Prot. Bureau v. Glob. Client Sols., LLC, No. 2:14-cv-06643-DDP-JPR (C.D. Cal. 
Aug. 25, 2014), http://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/201408_cfpb_consent-order_global-
client-solutions.pdf [http://perma.cc/8JPC-CGV9] (ordering Global Client Solutions to 
pay $6,099,000 in redress to consumers plus $1,000,000 in civil penalty to the CFPB); 
Estrella v. Freedom Fin. Network, LLC, 2012 WL 4645012, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 1, 
2012) (No. 09-CV-3156) (noting that Global Client Solutions and a co-defendant 
settled claims against them for $500,000). 
 181. See GLOB. CLIENT SOLS., http://www.globalclientsolutions.com [http://perma.c 
c/CU6Q-56QF]. 
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or state regulations has not effectively eliminated the profit motive in 
illegal debt-relief practices. 182  Unfortunately, this ensures that 
companies will adopt business models to continue to prey on vulnerable 
and economically distressed consumers.183 
III. A PROPOSAL FOR ENHANCING REGULATORY EFFORTS AND 
IMPOSING PERMANENT PENALTIES TO BETTER DETER THE UNFAIR, 
DECEPTIVE, AND ABUSIVE PRACTICES OF DEBT SETTLEMENT 
COMPANIES 
The current conditions of the debt settlement industry are 
unquestionably harmful, 184  and the debt settlement companies’ 
collective tenacity in circumventing any and all protections to 
consumers has thwarted efforts to extinguish the threat.185 Nevertheless, 
many American consumers still seek the help of debt settlement 
companies, and understandably so, as there is little other recourse to 
over-indebtedness.186 For example, a consumer alternatively could seek 
credit counseling, but he would ultimately have to pay in full the 
principal amount that he owes. 187  Consumers may also file for 
                                                                                                                 
 182. See N.Y.C. BAR ASS’N, supra note 10, at 95, 105. 
 183. Id. 
 184. Id. at 121 (noting that the debt settlement service model is inherently flawed); 
HARNICK & PARRISH, supra note 17, at 4 (noting that inherent dangers of debt 
settlement make it a risky debt relief option despite the FTC’s 2010 Telemarketing 
Sales Rule); Loonin, supra note 31, at 21 (recommending that all states ban debt 
settlement because of the harm these companies cause vulnerable consumers). 
 185. See supra notes 154-83 and accompanying text. 
 186. Fifty-six thousand consumers have enrolled in debt settlement plans between 
September 2010 and December 2012 in “several of the nation’s largest debt settlement 
providers” who are American Fair Credit Council (“AFCC”) members. See Options for 
Consumers in Crisis: An Economic Analysis of the Debt Settlement Industry, HEMMING 
MORSE LLP 1, 7 tbl. 4.1 (Feb. 28, 2013), http://www.americanfaircreditcouncil.org/wp-
content/uploads/2014/08/Options-for-Consumers-in-Crisis-as-of-Dec-12.pdf [http://per 
ma.cc/8KL4-GH6E]. The AFCC is an association of debt settlement companies that 
claims to provide memberships only to those debt settlement companies that are in full 
compliance with the FTC’s Telemarketing Sales Rule. Our Members, AM. FAIR CREDIT 
COUNCIL, http://www.americanfaircreditcouncil.org/our-members/ [http://perma.cc/WF 
D3-D2RA]. 
 187. Credit counseling agencies create personalized debt management plans for 
consumers, which may offer consumers pre-negotiated reductions of minimum 
payments and interest rates and the waiver of previously-imposed or ongoing fees, but 
rarely offer any reduction in the principal amount owed. See TASC Comment, supra 
note 13, at 7. 
406 FORDHAM JOURNAL [Vol. XXI 
 OF CORPORATE & FINANCIAL LAW 
bankruptcy relief, but many express concerns about the associated social 
stigma.188 These alternatives are even more disappointing given that debt 
settlement companies can offer real value when they are able to 
successfully and fairly negotiate a reduction in a consumer’s principal 
debt amount.189 Therefore, debt settlement companies should continue to 
exist in the debt-relief market as an option for consumers.190 
However, regulation of these companies must undergo considerable 
change before they can provide a viable and valuable debt-relief option 
for consumers.191 Current federal and state consumer protection laws are 
enforced and do provide penalties for UDAAP, but they are a weak 
deterrent against the substantially larger profits realized by companies 
engaging in these harmful practices.192 
A simple cost-benefit analysis will demonstrate that, when the 
expected penalty for an illegal act is greater than the expected profit 
associated with that act, companies will avoid that act because of its 
perceived unprofitability.193 Current federal and state regulations have 
yet to influence debt settlement companies’ economic decision-
making.194 Companies are not deterred from harmful practices because 
the prescribed penalties do not tip the scales such that profits from 
illegal activities are rendered insufficient to bear the costs of an 
unfavorable verdict in an enforcement action.195 To effectively temper 
                                                                                                                 
 188. Some consumers are concerned about the social stigma attached to bankruptcy. 
See Witte, supra note 12, at 282. Consumers who file for bankruptcy may view 
themselves as failures, or they may be labeled by society as “deadbeats who ‘rip off the 
system.’” Id. at 283. 
 189. See People v. Nationwide Asset Servs., Inc., 888 N.Y.S. 2d 850, 867, 870 
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2009). 
 190. See supra notes 186-89 and accompanying text. 
 191. See supra Part II discussing how continued UDAAP of debt settlement 
companies in the face of federal and state regulations make debt settlement a dangerous 
option for consumers in debt. 
 192. See Nelson, supra note 113, at 56; see also supra Part II, discussing how, 
despite increased regulation of debt settlement companies, the lack of effective 
enforcement of existing regulations allows debt settlement companies to engage in 
UDAAP. 
 193. See Nelson, supra note 113, at 56; see also Cost-Benefit Analysis: Deciding, 
Quantitatively, Whether to Go Ahead, MIND TOOLS, http://www.mindtools.com/pages/a 
rticle/newTED_08.htm [http://perma.cc/7FXB-SXJK] (discussing the cost-benefit 
analysis process and examples). 
 194. Debt settlement companies are choosing to violate consumer protection laws 
and face the penalties for doing so rather than choosing to comply. See supra Part II. 
 195. See, e.g., supra note 175 and accompanying text. 
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UDAAP, both state and federal regulations 196  must demand harsher 
penalties for consumer protection violations.197 
The CFPA penalty is a propitious contender as an effective 
deterrence mechanism that weighs heavily against the profit motive in 
UDAAP.198 The CFPA currently imposes the greatest civil penalty for 
violations of regulatory provisions.199 In particular, the CFPA imposes 
up to $25,000 for each day of a reckless violation, and up to $1 million 
for each day of a knowing violation, of “any provision of Federal 
consumer financial law,” including the CFPA.200  In comparison, the 
FTC levies only up to $16,000 in civil penalties for each violation of its 
consumer financial protection provisions, 201  and some states provide 
penalties as low as $500 for the violation of its consumer protection 
laws.202 
Before the CFPA’s civil money penalty can be used to effect real 
change, two significant obstacles must be overcome. First, the power to 
impose the CFPA civil money penalty is currently limited to 
enforcement actions brought by the CFPB.203 Second, debt settlement 
companies are able to avoid high civil penalties by dissolving their 
business under one name and business model, and continuing UDAAP 
under a different name or business model.204 
                                                                                                                 
 196. Federal, state, or private regulatory efforts individually are not enough to deter 
the UDAAP of debt settlement companies. See supra Part I. 
 197. See supra note 193 and accompanying text. 
 198. See supra note 193 and accompanying text. 
 199. See 12 U.S.C. § 5565(c) (2012) (setting forth civil penalty amounts for 
violating “any provision of Federal consumer financial law” depending on the type of 
violation: civil penalty of $5000 per day for violation of written law, rule or final order; 
$25,000 per day for reckless violation of consumer financial law; $1 million per day for 
knowing violation of consumer financial law). 
 200. Id. 
 201. See Complying with the Telemarketing Sales Rule, supra note 170. 
 202. See, e.g., S.C. CODE ANN. § 37-7-117 (Westlaw through 2015 Sess.). 
 203. Despite the fact that 12 U.S.C. § 5552(a)(1) allows state attorneys general to 
enforce the CFPA, further research of the fifty states’ debt settlement regulations 
indicates that none of the states have adopted the CFPA. 
 204. Individual companies may always re-emerge under an altered name or different 
business model. See, Franklin, supra note 5. Debt Solutions, Inc., after representing that 
they could not pay the penalties associated with the enforcement action brought by the 
FTC, operates today as DSI Financial, Inc. See supra notes 75-81 and accompanying 
text. 
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A. ENHANCING REGULATORY EFFORTS THROUGH MINI-CFPAS 
The first obstacle to using CFPA’s civil money penalty as an 
effective deterrent against debt settlement companies’ UDAAP is that 
only violations subject to the CFPB’s purview are currently subject to 
the CFPA’s penalty. 205  However, this restriction is not statutorily 
imposed: the CFPA expressly allows any state attorney general to bring 
civil actions to enforce and benefit from its provisions, including the 
civil penalty of $1 million per day for knowing violations.206 Each state 
has the ability to statutorily award its attorney general the power to 
attack predatory companies through CFPA provisions, in effect, creating 
a mini-CFPA. 207  State legislators need only amend their consumer 
protection laws to say that the state attorney general (or their equivalent) 
has the power expressly delegated to him by the CFPA to enforce the 
provisions of, and seek remedies under, the CFPA.208 
Several states have taken similar action, but instead of 
incorporating the CFPA, they have amended their consumer protection 
laws to look like mini-FTCAs.209 These amendments generally require 
state attorneys general to construe the state’s prohibition of UDAP 
consistently with the FTC.210 Though this is a step in the right direction, 
these amendments cannot effect significant change because the FTCA 
expressly preserves all enforcement powers and remedies for the FTC.211 
                                                                                                                 
 205. See supra note 203 and accompanying text. 
 206. 12 U.S.C. § 5552(a)(1) (“[T]he attorney general (or the equivalent thereof) of 
any State may bring a civil action in the name of such State in any district court of the 
United States in that State or in State court that is located in that State and that has 
jurisdiction over the defendant, to enforce provisions of this title or regulations issued 
under this title, and to secure remedies under provisions of this title or remedies 
otherwise provided under other law.”). 
 207. Id. States’ adoptions of the FTC Act into their own consumer protection acts 
have allowed them to follow FTC precedent. See infra note 210 and accompanying text. 
This Note proposes that states adopt the CFPA into their own consumer protection acts 
in the same way. 
 208. See infra note 210 and accompanying text. 
 209. Id. 
 210. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 501.204 (West, Westlaw through 2015 portion of 
2015-2016 Legis. Sess.) (“[D]ue consideration and great weight shall be given to the 
interpretations of the Federal Trade Commission . . . .”); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 48-618 
(West, Westlaw through 2015 portion of 2015-2016 Legis. Sess.) (“[I]t shall be an 
absolute defense to show that the challenged practices . . . comply with statutes 
administered by the federal trade commission . . . .”). 
 211. Compare 12 U.S.C. § 5552(a)(1), with 15 U.S.C. § 45 (2012). 
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In addition, the civil money penalties provided by the FTCA are 
significantly less than the penalties provided by the CFPA.212 Effecting 
mini-CFPAs would have a drastically different and far-reaching effect 
because of the CFPA’s express allowance for its enforcement by other 
authorities.213 Instead of merely asking state attorneys general to give 
credence to federal policy interpretations (as is the limitation of the 
FTCA), states can better protect consumers by empowering attorneys 
general through mini-CFPAs.214 
Mini-CFPAs are an aggressive approach to fraud protection, 
particularly in states that provide citizens with a private right of action 
under their consumer protection laws. 215  In those states, individual 
consumers may bring civil actions of their own authority to recover 
damages for violations of consumer protection laws.216 If states were to 
adopt the CFPA and private right of action provisions, consumers 
themselves could enforce the CFPA against debt settlement companies 
that continue any UDAAP.217 States should earnestly consider enacting 
such provisions since they not only act as an extra deterrent to debt 
settlement companies, but they would also incentivize injured 
consumers with colorable claims to take legal action against debt 
settlement companies, even those consumers who are in 
disadvantageous financial situations.218 
                                                                                                                 
 212. See supra notes 199-201 and accompanying text. 
 213. See 12 U.S.C. § 5552(a)(1). 
 214. See id. 
 215. This proposal is based on the fact that states with mini-FTC acts that provide 
individual consumers with the private right of action allow those consumers to sue 
under FTC precedent. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 501.211 (West, Westlaw through 
2015 portion of 2015-2016 Legis. Sess.) (providing individual consumers with the right 
to sue companies that violate the FTCA). 
 216. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN.§ 42-110g (West, Westlaw through 2015 
Sess.); IND. CODE ANN. § 24-5-0.5-4 (West, Westlaw through 2015 portion of 2015-
2016 Legis. Sess.); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 19.86.090 (West, Westlaw through 2015 
legislation). 
 217. See supra note 215 and accompanying text. 
 218. See supra note 146 and accompanying text. Although some states, such as 
Colorado, limit the amount of civil money penalties an individual consumer may seek 
in enforcement actions, states should allow consumers to seek the full civil money 
penalty, or a comparable penalty, available under the CFPA. See, e.g., COLO. REV. 
STAT. §§ 6-1-112(1)(a), 6-1-113 (West, Westlaw through 2015 portion of 2015-2016 
Legis. Sess.) (allowing attorney general to seek $2000 for each violation of the 
consumer protection statute while consumers may recover the greater of actual 
damages, $500, or “three times the amount of actual damages sustained.”). 
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B. IMPOSING PERMANENT PENALTIES THROUGH SURETY BONDS 
Empowering state attorneys general and individual consumers to 
enforce the CFPA’s civil penalty would present a real and prominent 
threat against the profit motives behind UDAAP.219 In the past, however, 
enforcement authorities have failed to collect huge civil penalties on 
debt settlement companies when, instead of paying imposed penalties, 
the companies simply closed their business.220 This is the second hurdle 
to expanding the province of the CFPB.221 Today’s regulatory regime 
leaves a loophole for a debt settlement company to evade legal 
responsibility by dissolving its business and simply resuming abusive 
practices under a new company name.222 The implications of this are 
twofold: not only are companies avoiding the repercussions of their 
actions, and in doing so, cheating consumers of dearly needed cash, but 
they are also cheating the system by repeating the predatory cycle on 
more innocent citizens.223 This massive regulatory oversight should be 
proactively remedied. 
To address these concerns, all states should require debt settlement 
companies operating in their states to post a surety bond.224 These surety 
bonds should be conditioned on the debt settlement companies 
complying with all consumer protection laws, both state and federal, and 
should be used automatically to pay the penalties associated with 
                                                                                                                 
 219. See supra note 193 and accompanying text. 
 220. See, for example, Stipulated Final Judgment and Order for Permanent 
Injunction and Other Equitable Relief Against All Defendants, Fed. Trade Comm’n v. 
Better Budget Fin. Servs., Inc., No. 04-CV-12326 (WGY) (D. Mass. Feb. 25, 2005), 
which is discussed in more detail in Part I.C.1. 
 221. See supra note 204 and accompanying text. 
 222. Individual companies may always re-emerge under an altered name or different 
business model. See e.g., Franklin, supra note 5. 
 223. Id. 
 224. Some states already require debt settlement companies to provide a surety bond 
in exchange for providing debt settlement services within their states. See, e.g., 225 ILL. 
COMP. STAT. ANN. 429/20 (West, Westlaw through 2015 Sess.) (requiring a $100,000 
bond to operate as a debt settlement provider in Illinois); N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. § 13-
11-04 (West, Westlaw through 2015 Sess.) (requiring surety bond of $50,000 for all 
debt settlement providers); 63 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. § 2525 (West, Westlaw 
through 2015 Sess.) (requiring a penal bond of $25,000 to operate debt settlement 
services in Pennsylvania). 
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violations of the consumer protection laws.225 These bonds should be 
structured to provide sufficient protection from the large CFPA fines.226 
At the time the bond is posted, the debt settlement company should also 
be required to represent, by submitting an affidavit sworn under oath, 
that it has not operated a similar business under any other name within 
the last five years.227  The combination of these requirements, which 
ensure that companies actually pay for the consequences and suffer the 
long-term effects of engaging in UDAAP, will further tip the scales 
against the attractiveness of violating consumer protection laws. 
CONCLUSION 
The debt settlement industry, as it is today, is dangerous to 
consumers who are in financial distress. However, debt settlement can 
be a viable and valuable debt-relief option for consumers if the industry 
is regulated properly such that the profits associated with engaging in 
UDAAP is heavily outweighed by the penalties for violating any 
consumer protection laws. 
In order to properly deter debt settlement companies from engaging 
in UDAAP in violation of current federal and state consumer protection 
laws, the states must adopt the CFPA, which provides the highest civil 
penalty costs against noncompliant debt settlement companies. These 
mini-CFPAs will fortify regulatory efforts against UDAAP in the debt 
settlement industry and increase the risk that the companies will face 
high penalty costs for UDAAP. 
Furthermore, to ensure that debt settlement companies do not evade 
the penalty costs by dissolving their companies in order to continue their 
harmful practices under a different name, states should require debt 
                                                                                                                 
 225. For example, Illinois requires a surety bond of $100,000 to incentivize debt 
settlement companies to comply with the state’s consumer protection laws and to be 
used to pay penalties in the instance of any violations of the laws. See 225 ILL. COMP. 
STAT. ANN. 429/20 (West, Westlaw through 2015 Sess.). 
 226. The CFPA can impose fines up to $1 million for each day during which a 
violation of the Act continues, which is the highest of any penalties associated with 
engaging in UDAP or UDAAP. See 12 U.S.C. § 5565(c) (2012). This Note does not 
purport to know what surety bond amount would be both fair to debt settlement 
companies and sufficient to recompense injured consumers. 
 227. The representation that the company has not operated under a different name in 
the last five years is best suited to extinguish concerns related to the fact that companies 
may continue their UDAAP under a different guise. See supra note 222 and 
accompanying text. 
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settlement companies to post surety bonds and swear in an affidavit that 
they have not operated a similar business under any other name in the 
past five years. The surety bonds will act as an insurance against 
UDAAP, and the affidavit will create long-term consequences for 
companies that have engaged in UDAAP in the past. 
Mini-CFPAs, together with surety bond requirements, will temper 
the UDAAP of debt settlement companies. As such, consumers will be 
able to seek debt relief with debt settlement companies with the 
confidence that these companies will comply with consumer protection 
laws.  In turn, these consumers will realize the full benefits that debt 
settlement can offer. With debt settlement as a realistic option for 
resolving debt, hopefully the number of American consumers living 
with debt and the amount of outstanding consumer debt in the United 
States will perpetually decrease. 
